



60 YEARS

OF UN PEACEKEEPING



**UN Peacekeeping Operations –
A Honourable History, Current Missions, Future Challenges**

Foreword by Colonel Bob Stewart

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WHY IS PEACEKEEPING IMPORTANT?



If states can fix their problem they will normally do so themselves. If they cannot then they often appeal to the United Nations. With 192 members encompassing every recognised state in the world and a stated aim to achieve world peace the United Nations is not only the world's forum but also its court of last resort.

Founded in 1945 the United Nations is meant to stop wars between countries and provide a platform for dialogue. Most certainly it does the latter but it habitually fails on the former. It is frequently hamstrung by disagreements in the United Nations Security Council as to the way ahead.

Through its resolutions the Security Council and it alone, is responsible for establishing international sanctions, peacekeeping operations and very rarely military peacemaking or peace enforcing actions. It has fifteen members; ten of them rotate periodically but five are the so-called permanent members. It is these permanent members (the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom) who hold real United

Nations power by virtue of the fact that they hold veto rights over any Security Council resolution.

Such a resolution requires nine out of fifteen affirmative votes but any such motion is dead in the water unless all five permanent members vote 'yes' or at least abstain. This veto right has stymied effective joint actions on numerous occasions. Since 1945 China has exercised its veto 6 times, France has done so 18 times, Russia on 123 occasions, the United States 43 times and the United Kingdom on 10 occasions.

Getting any peacekeeping resolution is a very tricky enterprise usually requiring a great deal of negotiation, bargaining, and concessions as well as lots of re-wording. In consequence most Security Council peacekeeping resolutions are far too weak. Their compromise language is often light years away from a resolution's original wording. As I know from my own particular experience during 1992 – 93 within the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, weak Security Council resolutions often make effective action for blue helmeted peacekeepers very difficult – but not impossible.

Where peacekeeping operations are likely to be flawed from their inception some argue that we should simply not even attempt to establish them. I disagree absolutely. The United Nations through its primary organ, the Security Council, may be an imperfect instrument to establish peacekeeping operations but it is far better than nothing.

In a conflict situation there is no higher authority than a Security Council peacekeeping resolution. Yet it is very easy to point out the many peacekeeping failures than highlight where international peacekeeping has

been a success. For instance, prior to my own United Nations peacekeeping deployment into Bosnia during 1992, almost all British commentators loudly proclaimed that such a move would be pointless. We could have no effect whatsoever and thousands would die from lack of medicines, cold or starvation regardless of what we did. They argued that our Security Council mandate was useless and would be totally ineffective as a guide for action. It wasn't; many people are alive today because of it. To the best of my knowledge nobody in my area of operations failed to get vital medication, protection from the cold or food in the bitter winter of 1992 – 93. I agree we had little impact on reducing battle casualties, we most certainly saved a lot of lives. In the total vacuum of international help that was available at the time UNPROFOR was far better than nothing.

Utopian, faulty, inadequate and limited though United Nations peacekeeping operations are so often they are often all we have got. Before we abandon the imperfect system of international peacekeeping we currently possess we should think hard what might replace it. To date I haven't seen a more effective, internationally approved, model of how we should keep the peace. We are stuck with what we have got so let's make the best of it.

Colonel Bob Stewart DSO
*Commanding Officer British Battalion
United Nations Protection Force,
Bosnia
1992 - 93*

THE BLUE HELMETS



Kuwait in 1991 are not covered by this publication.

Even without these operations, there is plenty to look at. UN peacekeeping operations now stretch from the jungles of the Great Lakes region of Africa, the deserts of Darfur and mountains of Lebanon.

As Colonel Bob Stewart amply illustrates in his article, the success of failure of UN missions is down to the quality of its personnel. During my travels to UN mission areas over the past 20 years I have witnessed first hand the dedication and bravery of

the current generations of peacekeepers. Although at one point it was fashionable to write off the UN as an organization that is bound to fail. Time and again, the UN's peacekeepers have proved the 'nay Sayers' wrong. UN peacekeeping is strong than ever and the Blue Berets may soon find themselves put to the test again if international efforts to broker peace between the Arabs and Israelis come to fruition.

Tim Ripley
Editor
60 Years of UN Peacekeeping

From its early origin's in the late 1940s, UN peacekeeping has grown into a huge area of international military activity than involves operations on almost every continent of the globe.

This publication aims to look at UN Peacekeeping's honourable history, examine its current operations and prospects for the future. It was also look at some the equipment and services that UN forces use on a daily basis to make peacekeeping happen.

The scope of this publication is strictly on peacekeeping operations directly mandated by the UN Security Council to be conducted by Blue Helmeted troops under the day-to-day control of the UN's Department of Peacekeeping. This of course excludes missions endorsed by the UN Security Council but conducted by national armed forces, regional organizations of ad hoc 'coalitions of the willing'. Therefore the UN mandated operations in to defend Korea in the 1950s and to liberate



60 YEARS OF UN PEACEKEEPING

Dr Amanda Cahill looks back over the history of UN peacekeeping

UN Peacekeeping operations have been transformed since the Security Council set up the first mission in 1948, to monitor the ceasefire between the newly independent Israel and its Arab neighbours. Over the past six decades the UN has conducted 63 peacekeeping mission around the world.

In the 60 years since that first mission was established a lot has changed about UN peacekeeping and there is much that has remained the same. At the end of 2008 some 91,712 UN peacekeeping personnel were wearing the famous Blue Beret or Helmet on 16 missions on four continents. Many of these are complex missions, involving not just monitoring ceasefire agreements between warring states but multi-sided internal conflicts, delivery of humanitarian aid and aspects of what could be called nation building.

The founder of UN peacekeeping, the Swedish diplomat Count Folke Bernadotte, who led the organisation's first mission to broker a ceasefire between Israel and its Arab neighbours in 1948, however would recognise many aspects of modern peacekeeping. He established the symbols or brand of UN peacekeepers - the white vehicles, black UN lettering and Blue Helmet. His ground breaking mission to the Middle East in 1948 set up many of the tried and tested mechanisms and processes of peacekeeping.

Sweden put into practice for the first time the principal that UN peacekeeping missions work for the UN Security Council in New York not national governments. Even through today it is an established norm, at the time it was a radical departure and

several generations of soldiers from around the world have been able to put on the Blue Helmet of the UN with pride, knowing that they serve a higher purpose than mere national interest.

The aspirations of the pioneers of UN peacekeeping, such as Bernadotte, have been found wanting on many occasions in its 60-year history but organization is now firmly established part of the world's political and security landscape.

Cold War Era

UN peacekeeping has gone through three distinct phases, determined largely by the nature of the international environment at the time. The first forty years of UN peacekeeping took place against a back drop of the superpower stand-off between the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War. This relegated UN peacekeeping efforts to what could be termed 'minor conflicts' that did not impact on the interests of the two Cold War 'power blocks'. Where the UN was given a role, it was of a

limited nature where the organization status as a 'honest broker' could be utilized. Classic examples of this were in the Arab Israeli conflict in 1948, 56 and 67, the India-Pakistan stand-off over Kashmir in 1948 and in the sectarian conflict in Cyprus in 1964.

UN peacekeepers were dispatched to monitor agreed ceasefire lines between the factions in these conflicts. The Blue Helmets acted as 'go-betweens' and gave the parties a means to resolve disputes before they escalated into open conflict again. It was not in the UN mandates of these operations for the peacekeeping mission to attempt to broker a permanent solution to these conflicts and as a result UN forces are still on duty in these regions today.

Two UN missions from this era were noticeably different from these earlier ceasefire monitoring missions and gave a pointer to the future of peacekeeping. In 1960 the newly independent government of the former Belgian colony of the Congo asked the UN to help fend off foreign



intervention. For four years some 20,000 UN troops from 30 nations helped Congolese troops control civil disorder, deal with interventions by rebels and mercenaries. Some 250 UN personnel were killed in the operation.

In 1978 the UN was called upon to deploy a peacekeeping force to the Lebanon to provide security along the country's southern border with Lebanon. Israeli troops had occupied the region to drive out Palestinian insurgents who were using it to launch attacks on border settlements. Although UN troops were able to deploy to the region, the underlying disputes between the parties were never resolved and the Blue Helmets found themselves stuck in the middle of an unresolved war. They were able to report on the course of the conflict and provide humanitarian assistance to the local population but they were never able to decisively influence events. This showed the dangers of deploying peacekeepers into war zones with no means to influence the underlying causes of the conflicts.

New World Order

The ending of the Cold War in 1989 transformed the relationships between the global super powers and opened up the possibilities for international co-operation to solve major crisis.

Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the sanctioning by the UN Security

Council of international military action to liberate the Gulf emirate pointed the way to what was sometimes called the new world order.

In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf conflict, the permanent members of the Security Council – the US, UK, France, China and Russia – agreed to an unprecedented expansion of UN peacekeeping missions. By 1993, there were more than 78,000 UN peacekeepers deployed around the world. In a two year period the UN found itself running major peacekeeping missions in Europe, Africa and the East.

The breakup of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991 led to the deployment the following year of the first elements of what became the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Over three years this grew to nearly 50,000 personnel and found itself engaged in humanitarian aid operations and peace enforcement actions to end the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Also in 1992, the UN dispatched some 22,000 military, police and civilian personnel to run elections in Cambodia and re-establish a functioning government in the civil war ravaged country. Later in 1992, the UN became involved in delivering humanitarian aid to Somalia as the country was devastated by famine and civil war. Three UN missions in

Somalia between 1992 and 1995 involved some 28,000 personnel at their peak.

The United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) began deploying its 2,500 troops in 1993 to help reduce tension after an internal conflict.

While the Cambodia mission was judged a success and opened the way for the re-establishment of an effective government, the missions in the Balkans, Somalia and Rwanda all ended in ignominy for UN peacekeepers. They found themselves under equipped and manned, as well as lacking in effective political mandates and rules of engagement, to intervene and protect civilians. In Rwanda and at Srebrenica in Bosnia, UN peacekeepers were driven aside by the warring factions, who then proceeded to massacre thousands of civilians. While in Somalia, local warlords put up heavy resistance to UN peacekeepers and many troops contributing nations eventually refused to put their troops at risk for little apparent gain.

These debacles seriously tarnished the reputation of UN peacekeeping missions and for the rest of the 1990s the Security Council proved loath to sanction the launching of major missions into complex crisis zones. By 1998 there were less than 20,000 UN peacekeepers deployed around the world, with the vast majority in the 'classic' missions monitoring agreed ceasefire lines.

New Century

Events in 1999 proved a turning point for UN peacekeeping with the launching of new missions in East Timor, West Africa and Kosovo. These missions had the strong support of the US and UK governments, allowing the UN forces to operate in a self-confident manner not seen for several years.

The crisis in the Serbian province of Kosovo in the first half of 1999, saw the UN called upon to set up a civil administration and police force. Later in the year the UN took over the



administration of East Timor. The UN was initially involved in running an independence referendum in August 1999 but when Indonesian troops tried to seize control of the territory, an Australian led military force intervened to protect UN personnel and civilians. Subsequently a UN peacekeeping force and civil administration arrived to steer East Timor to independence in 2002.

A UN force deployed to the West African country of Sierra Leone in 1999 to try to broker an end to a long running civil war. However, the first elements of the UN force to deploy by early 2000 were poorly equipped and supplied. When rebel fighter launched an offensive in 2000 UN and government troops were outgunned and soon in retreat. British troops were dispatched to the country to secure the capital and they then began directly support UN troops. Several joint UK-UN operations were mounted to relieve isolated UN contingents. Rebel forces were in full retreat and by 2005 the country was stable enough for UN forces subsequently to withdraw.

Complex Missions

The successful conduct of the UN missions in Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone transformed the appetite of the international community to support UN peacekeeping missions around the world. Also the heavy engagement of US military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan meant the US government was keen to turn to the UN to shoulder the burden of peacekeeping missions, particularly in Africa.

Instability in Liberia and the Ivory Coast resulted in the UN being involved in running mediation and peacekeeping missions with relative success. Far bigger challenge were faced in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan.

The eastern regions of the DRC had been the scene of conflict for most of the 1990s as Rwandan rebel groups and local insurgents

challenged the authority of the country's government. Thousands of people were made homeless and killed in the fighting. From 1999 onwards the UN began to progressively build up its forces in the region to help the DRC government re-establish control in the lawless region and to protect civilians. By 2009 some 18,000 UN personnel were operating in the region. Although the UN force had a robust mandate, it lacked large amounts of heavy military equipment and the size of its area of responsibility was so big that the force was heavily stretched. In 2006, the European Union deployed a rapid reaction force to help boost the UN force during the DRC's general election.

Sudan is a proving to be the most complex and difficult challenge for the UN in the first decade of the 21st Century. An outbreak of fighting in the Darfur region in 2003 between rebels and government backed militia led to more than 500,000 people fleeing the fighting. An under-equipped African Union force deployed to the region in 2004 to help protect humanitarian aid operations but it was soon in need of help. In 2007, a UN force of 17,000 troops was authorized to help the African Union force. At the same time the European Union deployed to neighbouring Chad to

protect refugee camps there for people who had fled across the border. This has since been replaced by a UN force.

In southern Sudan, the UN was also heavily involved in brokering a ceasefire between rebels and the Khartoum in 2005 and subsequently a 10,000 strong UN force deployed to police the comprehensive peace agreement.

The UN engagement in Lebanon was transformed in 2006 as a result of the war between Israeli forces and Hizbullah militia fighters. As the conflict turned into stalemate in August 2006, the combatants turned to the UN to act as a buffer force. European nations led by France offered to provide reinforcements to UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). In a few weeks some 12,000 UN troops were patrolling the Lebanon-Israeli border, back by a dozen warships assigned to the newly formed UN Maritime Task Force

At the end first decade of the 21st Century, UN peacekeeping have come full circle. The number of troops, police and civil administrators is greater than in 1993 with some 92,000 personnel deployed in mission areas.



PEACEKEEPING IN 21ST CENTURY

Colonel Bob Stewart *looks at role of the UN troops in crisis zones around the world.

“I don’t need the permission of the bloody HVO. I’m from the United Nations.” The place was Ahmici, Central Bosnia on 22nd April 1993. Soldiers of the Bosnian Croat Army (HVO) had just questioned a United Nations officer as to his right to be at a massacre site. I was that officer.

At the time I was the British United Nations Battalion Commander and, unknown to me, my angry retort to that challenge was broadcast around the World. Yet it perfectly reflected how I felt. I believed then, as I still do, that there is no higher military licence on earth than to operate wearing a Blue Helmet. As a United Nations peacekeeper, mandated by the Security Council, I felt both empowered and emboldened to act.

Everyone expects so much of the United Nations, especially when it comes to solving the problems of the World. In my own personal experience this was particularly so in Bosnia in 1992-93. Yet the truth is that the United Nations is frequently tasked with such troubles precisely because they are so problematic. Too often the organisation is ‘carted’ with intractable situations. Thus the United Nations becomes a court of last resort from which impossible, miracle settlements acceptable to all sides are demanded.

Of course a founding principle of the United Nations is unanimity of purpose. But unanimity is impossible without compromise in any political system and the organisation is most certainly that. For peacekeepers in the field that means any instructions received are likely to be a compromise between the political aspirations of all nations drafting those directives. Mandates will normally be the sum of the ‘bottom line’ option that each state can accept. This is a fact of life

and it is no good ranting and railing about it.

Peacekeepers have to get on with the job on the ground. In my view United Nations’ officers should be realistic and a little thankful when any mandate, imperfect or not, can be agreed. It is up to such military officers in the field to implement their mandates practically, possibly interpreting events on the ground in a way that the Security Council cannot. If commanders are careful they can have much more operational freedom than at first it seems. The decisions of those under pressure of real events in the field and against the clock are also viewed with much more sympathy than decisions examined in great detail and with no deadlines in an international debating chamber. Fewer questions are asked when actions are taken in direct response to a problem and with a gut feeling for what is right.

Thus United Nations officers have to be highly professional in the way they handle themselves. They must start by establishing their credentials with local decision-makers. This does not come automatically by wearing a Blue Helmet. They need to get out on the ground and meet key personalities. Personal relationships are vital in a situation that has no established order and often a problem which seems impossible one moment can be solved almost instantly in a conversation. I believe that United Nations peacekeeping operations are primarily ‘officers’ wars because military leaders have to be right in the front line so often.

Peacekeepers have to be absolutely clear as to when they can use force and when they cannot. Rules of engagement have to be understood intimately by every Blue Helmet. Prior

to Bosnia I was sent several pages of complicated close-written instructions from the United Nations on this subject. For a soldier operating on the ground, under fire and under great time pressure, something much shorter was required. The British Army during its long years in Northern Ireland produced such instructions on what they called the ‘yellow card’. It was simple and concise. I duplicated such a system for Bosnia. Thankfully I gather United Nations instructions on rules of engagement are now greatly simplified.

It is vital for United Nations soldiers to be seen as effective outside their theatre of operations – particularly in their home country. This is where the media enters the equation. Regular armies often have a deep suspicion of the media, not just because just they might not like detailed scrutiny of the way they operate but also because of



security. Yet surely there should be few military secrets about United Nations peacekeeping operations? What is there to be secret about? In fact I believe the media should always be considered a crucial factor in all United Nations peacekeeping actions. A camera can be more powerful than a gun.

In the Balkans getting the media message across required a two-pronged approach. On the ground in Central and Northern Bosnia there were many local television and radio stations. I volunteered myself or my officers to appear and speak on them as often as possible. Such broadcasts were never censored and what was said by the United Nations' representatives was broadcast exactly. In Bosnia most people believed what they learnt from the media. Thus it was vital that we gave out our message frequently, if only to counter the 'big lie' someone else would almost certainly be feeding them elsewhere. At one stage we were able to arrange an exclusive programme about what we were

doing each Saturday night on TV Vitez. I know most United Nations operations take place where 'luxuries' such as local television and radio stations are almost non-existent but, where such facilities are present, their full use must always be considered.

At the international level it is also important that people in home countries see what their troops are doing. Domestic, and for that matter international opinion, matter greatly - both for the Blue Helmeted troops and for the reputation of the United Nations more generally.

There are far too many reports of United Nations' failures in the media whilst its successes are often ignored or sidelined. Bad news makes good copy and sells newspapers; good news normally sells little. This dilemma is always a challenge but it is one that United Nations commanders must grasp. At a minimum the media must be told the truth.

Sometimes though, members of the media can help during tricky

operational negotiations. In Bosnia, the presence of a camera team once produced a marked improvement in attitudes. "Commander I understand that you do not wish to allow us to pass through your checkpoint despite the fact that your headquarters has authorised it," said in front of a camera had an immediate effect. In a similar way the mere presence of cameras at a ceasefire negotiation session can also have an effective impact. Handled with care, understanding and intelligence the Media can be a useful adjunct to a United Nations armoury - and there is no requirement to comply with rules of engagement!

It is far too easy to castigate the United Nations for its failures and forget its successes. I am very proud to have been a United Nations officer. In future Blue Helmet will continue to have a large international role. But it is no good blaming the United Nations when its troops are hamstrung by ineffective Security Council mandates which have been manipulated, for national advantage, by its members

primarily sitting there with permanent seats and veto power. The United Nations may be responsible for its mandates but the fault for poor ones normally lies with its members.

I believe in robust intervention by United Nations forces. Indecision is too often a precursor to failure. The most successful United Nations operations are those in which real authority for action has been given to good commanders backed by well-trained and motivated soldiers. In conflict situations decisive international action is usually welcomed by the majority of suffering people on all sides. Those that oppose such action are normally those who have most to gain by continued insecurity and violence. They are probably relatively safe from it too!

If members of the United Nations truly want the organisation to succeed they should be prepared to send their best troops on international operations. Certain armies are not suitable to carry out duties where they would be expected to adapt, be flexible and run risks to prove their point. Such troops are just not up to dealing with the stresses, strains and intricate politics involved in United Nations operations. In principle they should not be used



on international deployments. Of course I am aware that United Nations duties pay well for some states and that the Security Council often has no option or choice but to include below-par soldiers on peacekeeping operations. This is another dilemma

for the United Nations but it is one that member states could readily solve should they wish it.

Some might suggest that United Nations peacekeeping operations are so complex and soul-destroying that they should be abandoned. But those who argue this way have probably never looked into the frightened eyes of people who live in a stricken country whose only hope lies in what an international force might, just might, be able to achieve. There, but for the grace of God, go all of us.

The noble motives behind the United Nations Charter place huge responsibility on the organisation to look after the world's sufferers. Such victims are really what the United Nations is all about and we cannot abandon them to their fate without even trying. Peacekeeping operations may be imperfect instruments for dealing with so many problems but they are often all we've got left. So let's make United Nations peacekeeping operations as good as they can get.

**Colonel Bob Stewart, DSO, was Commanding Officer of the British Battalion in the United Nations Protection Force, Bosnia, during 1992 – 93*



FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR UN PEACEKEEPING

Tim Ripley considers the prospects for UN peacekeeping missions over the coming decade as the global economic crisis continues, the international order evolves and a new administration settles into the White House.

From the bare statistics it would appear that UN peacekeeping is a growth industry. In the current year it will spend more than \$7 billion on deploying more than 90,000 peacekeepers around the world as part of 16 missions. These figures make the UN the second largest active military force on the planet, after the US armed forces. That represents a 60% increase in the number of peacekeepers on active duty compared to at the turn of the century. This is something of a renaissance for UN peacekeeping after the crisis of the 1990s.

However, the UN faces major challenges in its current peacekeeping operations and there is considerable uncertainty about whether the organization has the capacity to take on new missions.

At a recent conference at the Royal United Services Institute in London to mark the International Day of UN Peacekeepers, Dr Bruce Jones, Director Centre for International Co-operation,

University of New York, said the UN had to “pull up its socks up” of the organization might “enter cycle of bust”.

On the immediate horizon, the UN’s major peacekeeping missions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Darfur and Sudan face intractable harassment from local forces, are struggling to get nations to contribute troops and have to deal with widespread humanitarian crisis across their mission areas. The underlying lack of political solutions to the conflicts in these regions means the UN peacekeepers can only limit the fallout from them rather than bring a lasting solution.

Dr Jones, who has served as a high level official of the UN, commented that the revamped UN mission in Lebanon offered many lessons and a potential route to enhance UN peacekeeping capabilities world wide. He described this mission and “important innovation” that involved the UN in nation building in an unprecedented way.

While the UN has managed to reform many of the technical aspects of setting up and running peacekeeping missions, Dr Jones made the case that only if the UN is able to employ diplomacy and political influence to resolve the underlying causes of conflicts and disputes will peacekeepers be able to secure success on the ground.

“Peacekeeping has to be integrated to a political process” said Dr Jones. “We have co-ordination of political, economic and military arms of UN”.

As UN intervention between warring states is now a relatively rare phenomenon and many UN missions take-place within so-called failed states, he said the organization had to apply itself to rebuilding governments and societies ripped apart by conflict. He identified transitional security, the underpinning national political institutions and security sector reform as key areas for the UN. “We have look at ways to take force out of politics” he said.



While it is difficult to predict where the next crisis or conflict will require the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force, it is increasingly apparent that as international diplomatic efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute are gaining momentum under the leadership of US President Barak Obama. With US and NATO forces still committed in strength to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, the only international organization with the capability and capacity to mount a major peacekeeping operation to underpin any peace deal between the Israelis and Palestinians is the UN.

Such a mission would involve the UN in the strategic heart of the Middle East and place the fate of a major international

peace agreement in its hands. Although the final shape of any peacekeeping mission in Palestine is still very nebulous, it would undoubtedly be very complex and involve many peacekeeping disciplines. These could range from monitoring borders and airspace, rebuilding Palestinian society and its security forces as well as assisting in humanitarian aid operations and economic reconstruction.

The strategic importance of such a mission would mean that European countries are likely to be the main contributors to such as force, as was the case in Lebanon in 2006. This means the UN force would be well resourced and have access to the best human resources

in European armed forces and foreign ministries. In itself this goes a long way raising the chances of the mission will be successful.

While the outcome of President Obama's drive for peace in the Middle East is still highly uncertain, it seems highly likely that the UN will be called upon to help resolve and ameliorate conflicts in Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia. UN peacekeeping is still has "strategic value" in such situation, says Dr Jones.

The Blue Helmets of the UN look like being on duty in global 'hot spots' for many years to come.



AT A GLANCE - UN PEACEKEEPING IN 2009

Personnel (as at 31 March 2009)

- Uniformed personnel: 79,677 troops; 10,284 police and 2,366 military observers 92,327
- Countries contributing uniformed personnel: 117
- International civilian personnel: 5,875
- Local civilian personnel: 12,961, UNV Volunteers 2,231
- Total number of personnel serving in 16 peacekeeping operations: 13,376
- Total number of fatalities in peace operations since 1948: 2,588

Financial Aspects

- Approved budgets for the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 June 2009: About \$7.1 billion (Includes requirements for the support account for peacekeeping operations and the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi (Italy).)
- Estimated total cost of operations from 1948 to 30 June 2008: About \$54 billion
- Outstanding contributions owed to the UN by nations for peacekeeping: About \$1.75 billion

